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  Recent contributions to the empirical analysis of the relationship between 
financial system development and economic growth found that an exogenous 
component of financial system development causes economic growth, is a good 
predictor of growth and that its growth impact is relatively large. In addition, the 
empirical literature on banking crises predicts that their adverse effects on 
economic growth will rise in the absence of an adequate response by the 
government. Given these findings and considering that the Russian government 
failed to respond adequately to the 1998 banking crisis, Russia’s strong economic 
growth since the crisis is a puzzle. The paper attempts to analyze Russia’s growth 
process and to empirically make visible the impact of the banking crisis. It is found 
that the growth costs of the crisis may have been even larger than suggested by a 
simulation that uses growth coefficients from the literature. This adverse growth 
impact was compensated by other expansionary effects. The finding corroborates 
those studies that argue for the importance of financial system development in 
promoting growth in transition countries. 
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1. Introduction   
 
The Russian banking crisis of 1998 may be important in economic history for two 
main reasons: Firstly, its immediate adverse effects on deposits, lending, and net 
worth of commercial banks were extreme, and secondly, there was no official 
response for more than four years with any serious banking restructuring program. 
Instead the banking system was “stabilized” through central bank credit and 
forbearance concerning rule enforcement. This offers a unique opportunity to study 
the economic growth effects of a banking crisis under the condition that the 
authorities do not respond with serious banking restructuring measures.  
In addition, since the empirical literature on banking crises unanimously concludes 
that their adverse effects on economic growth and thus their costs will rise without 
such measures, Russia’s strong economic growth since the banking crisis is a 
puzzle. The large ruble real devaluation in 1998 served as the immediate trigger of 
the banking crisis but also liberated the economy from the ruble overvaluation 
supported by advice and loans from the IMF. Thus, it may be hypothesized that the 
Russian banking crisis dampened economic growth but its effect was compensated 
by other expansionary effects such as the currency depreciation and oil price rise. 
The paper attempts to empirically make visible the growth costs of the banking 
crisis using -for the first time that this has been done for a transition country- a 
quantitative assessment of the contribution of the financial system to economic 
growth in Russia. This involves a broader attempt in explaining Russian growth. 
Illustrative simulations show how real GDP could have evolved had there not been 
the banking crisis. The analysis is largely based on the cross-country empirical 
analysis of the relationship between financial system development and economic 
growth, especially the causality aspect, as in Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), who 
found that an exogenous component of financial system development causes 
economic growth and is a good predictor of future economic growth. The empirical 
analysis of banking crises (e.g. Dziobek and Pazarbasioglu, 1997, Tang et al., 2000) 
identifies requirements for minimizing their economic costs, which were clearly not 
carved out in the Russian case. The failure of the Russian government to meet the 
requirements for successful banking restructuring calls into question the 
effectiveness of western loan conditionality and necessitates a broader discussion. 
The analysis challenges the view that “given the small size of the financial sector, 
the macro-economy would be relatively little affected by the immediate impact of 
financial sector distress” (IMF, 2003, p.1), and it has implications beyond Russia 
also because such an assessment for a key transition country has not yet been 
undertaken. 
The paper starts in section 2 with a brief review of the recent literature on financial 
sector development and economic growth and arguing in section 3 that after the 
Russian crisis the requirements for successful banking restructuring were not met. 
Section 4 presents the empirical analysis of the impact of the banking crisis on 
economic growth including illustrative growth simulations. Section 5 concludes. 
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2  Brief review of the recent literature on financial sector development and 
economic growth  
 
In their empirical study of the relationship between financial market development 
and economic growth, King and Levine (1993) suggested four indicators to define 
financial development. Since their study used a large sample of some 80 developing 
and developed countries, their indicators were limited by data availability and thus 
they were relatively crude. Nevertheless, these indicators proved powerful in 
describing financial development and are readily available for transition countries 
including Russia. King and Levine’s financial indicators are given in table 1 in 
columns one to four for different groups of countries. The table also includes two 
advanced transition countries (Hungary and Poland) and Russia for 1993 and 2002. 
For later use in simulations, maximum values of these financial indicators 
worldwide are shown in column 5. In addition, for the transition countries two 
indicators not used by King and Levine (1993) are shown, namely the ratio of total 
bonds outstanding to GDP and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP.  
 
As can be seen, for the long period examined by King and Levine (1993), higher 
per capita growth is associated with higher levels of financial development. (The 
indicators tend to rise with higher economic growth). Their regressions do not only 
find statistically significant contemporaneous correlations between financial 
indicators and per capita growth, capital accumulation and a measure of total factor 
productivity growth, but also significant correlations between initial levels of 
financial development and subsequent economic growth, capital accumulation and 
TFP growth.
1 The latter finding supports the hypothesis that financial development 
can cause economic growth and be a predictor of long-run growth. In the cross-
sectional study by Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) the causality between financial 
development and economic growth was explicitly analyzed.
2 It was found that 
economic growth is at least partly explained by the effect of the exogenous 
component of financial development and that this quantitative impact is relatively 
large as estimated below also for Russia. 
                                                           
1 In King and Levine (1993) the cross-country per capita growth regressions are based on a standard 
modern growth model that includes as independent variables alternatingly the first four financial 
indicators given in table 2 (significant at least at the 5% level) and that controls for initial income, 
initial secondary school enrollment rate, ratio of trade to GDP, ratio of government spending to 
GDP, and average inflation rate. 
2 Two econometric methods were used that address specifically the problems induced by 
endogeniety of the explanatory variables such as in growth regressions, and which enable one to 
extract the exogenous component of financial intermediary development: Dynamic GMM panel 
estimators, which the authors use with data for 74 countries averaged over seven 5-year intervals 
composing the period 1960-95, and, in addition, a purely cross-sectional estimator but with 
instrumental variables technique and using averaged data for 71 countries over the same period, i.e. 
one observation per country. Although these estimations do not reject the view that financial 
development is influenced by economic growth, they show that the latter is not the only cause for 
the significant positive correlation between the two.    4
Table 1 
Average levels of financial development of a large sample of developing and developed 
countries (excluding major oil exporters) during the period 1960-1989, and for Poland, 
Hungary and Russia in 1993 and 2002 
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1) Annual real GDP per capita growth rate < 0.5.  
2) Annual real GDP per capita growth rate > 0.5 < 2.0. 
3) Annual real GDP per capita growth rate > 2.0 and < 3.0. 
4) Annual real GDP per capita growth rate > 3.0. 
5) Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), Table 8, pp. 64-66 
6) Ratio of deposit money bank domestic assets to deposit money bank domestic assets plus central 
bank domestic assets. 
7) Bonds denominated in domestic currency. 
8) for Hungary, Poland, and Russia: 1990-2002.   5
Note: Data for 2002 are preliminary. Arithmetic averages of this years end-of-period and last years 
end-of-period financial stocks are used to mitigate the problem of deflating financial stocks by GDP 
flow. 
Sources: Central Bank of Russia (2003), EBRD (2002), International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics, King and Levine (1993), Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000). 
 
 
Table 1 shows also that financial indicators of Hungary and Poland during 1993-
2002 improved substantially to levels of fast or very fast growing countries. By 
contrast, Russia´s financial development indicators during this period were retarded 
(Table 2).
3 Indicators 1 (financial depth), 2 (importance of banks relative to central 
bank), and 4 (credit to nonfinancial private sector relative to GDP) were in 2002 





Russia: Evolution of financial market indicators 1993-2002 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Indicator 1 
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EBRD Index of reform of non-
banking financial institutions 
 





Note: Indicators 1-4: The annual figures are averages of four quarterly values. Indicators 5-6: end of 
period. The EBRD indices for policy reforms are based on a scale ranging from 1, which is the 
lowest grade, to 4+, representing the highest score. They are explained in detail in the annual 
transition reports by the EBRD. 
Sources: EBRD (2002), International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (2003), 
Russian Central Bank (2003). 
                                                           
3 The levels of indicators 1 and 4 in 2002 were still at a level comparable to that of the group of very 
slow growing countries. And regarding indicators 2 and 3 a substantial improvement occurred only 
recently during 2001 and 2002.   6
 
Only Russia’s stock market capitalization indicator developed better than those of 
Hungary and Poland, which was due to Russia’s wealth in energy and raw materials 
in association with the rise in oil prices since 1999. Table 2 shows that the currency 
and banking crisis of 1998 had a substantial impact on Russia’s financial indicators. 
Until 1998 most indicators had improved almost continuously.
4 The crisis reversed 
this rising trend but since about 2000 the positive trend returned and accelerated 
together with the economic recovery. The table also shows the annual evaluation of 
financial sector reforms by the EBRD showing that the quality level of financial 
system supervision and regulation was relatively low even before the crisis and that 
it fell afterwards to very low standards until about 2002.  
 
3  Russia’s paradox: Strong growth with no banking reform 
 
The large Ruble currency depreciation and the government’s default on its domestic 
Ruble debt in August/September 1998 became instantaneously an open banking 
crisis.
5 Causes of the crisis and its immediate effects are described in the appendix, 
which also provides additional evidence of inadequate banking supervision in the 
years following the crisis. However, Russia’s output recovered quickly and strongly 
following the severe crisis. The recovery started already in October 1998 and 
annual real GDP growth reached 5.4% and 9% in 1999 and 2000, respectively, and 
remained afterwards above 4%.
6 This is impressive since the empirical analysis of 
banking crises (e.g. Sundararajan and Balino, 1992, Borish et al., 1995, Gray and 
Holle, 1996 and 1997, Dziobek and Pazarbasioglu, 1997, Tang et al., 2000) 
identifies the following requirements for minimizing the economic costs associated 
with such crises, which were clearly not carved out in Russia: 
•  comprehensiveness of a banking restructuring program, i.e. operational and 
systemic restructuring of the banking sector. Successful systemic 
restructuring of banks implies that both the stock of non-performing loans 
and the flow of new bad loans are reduced to very small proportions. 
Operational restructuring means improvement of the internal operations of 
                                                           
4 The substantial decrease of indicator 3 in 1996 is due to banks’ buying of short-term Russian 
government treasury bills, which crowded out lending to the private sector. This was one cause for 
the banking crisis due to the government’s default on its debt. The decease of indicator 3 during two 
years prior to the crisis is thus highly interconnected with the crisis. This is a relevant aspect in the 
following simulations of developments that assume absence of the banking crisis.  The reader may 
ask why indicator 4, which has the same numerator as indicator 3, did not decrease in 1996. The 
reason is that the denominator of indicator 4, nominal GDP, was strongly dampened due to the 
drastic reduction of inflation during 1996 and 1997 so that this ratio remained constant. 
5 See Buchs (1999), Chapman and Mulino (2001), and Thießen (2000). 
6 There are two main explanations for the recovery. The first is that the real currency depreciation 
“liberated” the economy from the brakes put on it by the previous long lasting overvaluation. The 
depreciation caused import substitution and growth of real non-energy exports. The second 
explanation is the strong rise of oil prices during 1999 and 2000 associated with a continuous 
moderate increase in oil production since October 1998 boosting energy export revenues. 
Econometric analysis below attempts to clarify the role of these factors during the recovery.   7
banks, including their risk-management systems, and possibly replacement 
of managements and owners. 
•  prompt corrective action (i.e. implementing a restructuring program within a 
time period that does not exceed say 10 months following the crisis), and  
•  bank restructuring undertaken by the government and not the central bank 
(in order to avoid the risk that non-transparent central bank financial support 
to banks inflates the costs of restructuring that eventually fall on the budget 
and may risk high inflation). 
 
At the outset of a banking crisis it is difficult to distinguish between insolvent banks 
and temporarily illiquid ones and thus the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) met its 
lender of last resort function by providing liquidity to most banks that faced 
liquidity problems so as to mitigate further adverse effects. But these measures were 
seriously flawed because this process was neither transparent nor orderly.
7 Perhaps 
more crucially, the CBR (who has the responsibility for banking regulation and 
supervision) and the government failed to implement promptly both a transparent 
bank restructuring program and improvement and enforcement of prudential 
regulations for banks. The government failed to implement promptly an 
indispensable program to deal with bank debtors, i.e. restructuring of non-financial 
enterprises, and enforcement of liability for any overdue debt with property of the 
debtor.
8 This lack of action in connection with both leniency of the central bank 
regarding the violation of prudential rules and its generously granted “stabilization 
credits”, most of which were uncollateralized, reinforced incentives for bank 
managements and their owners to “gamble for resurrection” of their banks, take 
high risks, distribute “profits” despite solvency problems and engage in “asset 
stripping” and lobbying for further leniency and state support. 
In the view of many observers the lack of government action with regard to 
implementing serious banking restructuring measures continued through several 
years after the crisis (e.g. MFK Renaissance Capital, 2000), which is corroborated 
by the evaluation of financial sector reforms through the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (shown at the bottom of Table 2).  
As a result most of the bankrupt banks were not liquidated. In fact, Table 3 shows 
that after the financial crisis the number of revoked licenses for credit institutions 
surprisingly even decreased drastically. The number of institutions liquidated on the 
ground of violation of legislation increased after the crisis but many banks were not 
                                                           
7 There was little control over the use of the funds provided, the criteria regarding the selection of 
banks that received support were not defined, and the transfer of deposits from commercial banks to 
Russia’s dominating savings bank  (Sberbank) has in many cases not been associated with a transfer 
of assets to Sberbank of equal market value. To some extent these problems may have been the 
result of political influences on the CBR. See, for instance, the very critical assessment by MFK 
Renaissance Capital (2000). 
8 Although the improved bankruptcy law, which came into effect in March 1998, caused a 
substantial increase in the number of bankruptcies, many enterprises, particularly large ones, large 
debtors to energy producers, and also the latter, continued to enjoy leniency.    8
liquidated despite having lost their license, which resulted in the phenomenon of 
“phantom banks”.  
 
Table 3 
Russia: Number of credit institutions and revoked licenses 1995-2002 
(End of period) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Number of credit institu-

















Change  n.a. n.a.  -27  -81  -105 -252 -120 -178 
Revoked licenses   216  275  329  227  127  33  12  10 
Credit institutions liquidated 
owing to revocation of 


































Source: Central Bank of Russia, Bulletin of Banking Statistics, various issues, IMF 
(2002). 
 
Thus, the financial crisis of 1998 was allowed to impact on economic growth 
unhindered, all other things held equal. For this unique case, where the authorities 
are not implementing any serious banking restructuring program in response to a 
major banking crisis, we attempt in the following section to simulate the growth 
costs. This is also the first time such an analysis is carried out for a transition 
country. 
 
The view needs to be acknowledged, however, that there can be an optimal degree 
of forbearance in a crisis situation depending on factors such as the nature of the 
shock and its degree of permanence and on the authorities’ ability to carry out an 
effective restructuring program. This could call for an analysis of the pros and cons 
of forbearance relative to restructuring of the banking system in the specific 
Russian situation. However, the country samples used by the cited empirical 
literature on banking crises included a large number of such crises, which were 
caused by different types of shocks and which occurred in countries with large 
differences in their economic development and quality of their governments. But on 
the basis of these many cases of banking crises, which were also examined 
individually, this literature unanimously finds that forbearance and delaying 
implementation of a comprehensive restructuring program tends to raise the real 
economic costs of such crises substantially, i.e. it makes things only worse. 
Nevertheless there could be well defined exceptions to this rule, which this 
literature may have overlooked and it must be admitted that a deeper analysis as to 
whether Russia could be such an exception is not offered here.
9 However, since the 
                                                           
9 Many observers of Russia’s financial system development argue, however, that forbearance during 
and after the crisis in 1998 was further damaging the financial system. See, for instance, Russian 
European Centre for Economic Policy (1999) and MFK Renaissance Capital (2000).   9
incentives provided by the IMF in the form of large and relatively cheap adjustment 
loans failed in convincing the government to adopt a banking restructuring program 
one should think of alternatives to these loans. Alternatives appear to be advice, 
which is offered not with a “carrot and stick” policy (i.e. providing cheap loans and 
then threatening of ending to supply them further) but which is provided by an 
international mix of completely politically independent economists who have no 
loans to offer and thus are dependent on truly convincing their Russian counterparts 
if they want to achieve that any improvements are actually implemented. Appendix 
B attempts to provide a brief discussion of policy options that could help to improve 
financial development. 
  
4.  Empirical analysis: Simulations of the impact of the 1998 banking crisis on 
economic growth  
 
We perform two types of illustrative simulations to assess the impact of the banking 
crisis on economic growth. Firstly, growth regressions for Russia are estimated, 
which, following King and Levine (1993) and Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), 
include as explanatory variables the financial indicators. The regressions should 
produce an ex-post forecast for real GDP as accurately as possible so that it can be 
used in simulating the impact of financial development scenarios on economic 
growth. Secondly, these results are then briefly compared with those obtained using 
estimated coefficients of the impact of the same financial indicators on per capita 
economic growth from the cross-country regressions by Levine, Loayza, and Beck 
(2000).  
 
a)  Growth regressions for Russia 
 
Growth regressions for Russia were estimated using quarterly data for the period 
1995-2003 using the data from the Russian European Centre for Economic Policy. 
At the outset it must be emphasized that the objections concerning estimating such 
regressions for one country and a relatively short period are recognized. Owing to 
the relatively few degrees of freedom they cannot be convincingly rejected and 
therefore those simulations that are based on these regressions are illustrative only. 
However, the results obtained from using the coefficients from the literature point 
in the same direction as those obtained from using growth regressions for Russia. 
Thus, both types of simulations support the view that the contribution of the 
financial sector to growth is often underestimated, which provides incentives to 
strengthening reforms in this sector. In addition, the exercise sheds light on the 
growth process in Russia. It should be viewed as a first step that should be followed 
by performing simulations based on cross-section data and where a clear link 
between financial development variables and regulatory and institutional 
characteristics is established, which admittedly is now still missing. 
 
Preliminary estimations using as a natural starting point the augmented Solow 
growth model as suggested by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) and adapted for   10
the one country Russian case, made clear that this model does not adequately 
describe the transition period. It was also found that both the Chow breakpoint and 
Chow forecast test strongly rejected the hypothesis of parameter constancy before 
and after the financial crisis in 1998. All this underlines the complexity of the 
growth process in Russia during transition, and it suggests to include in regressions 
that cover the whole transition period a dummy variable that represents the 
structural break in 1998 or to treat the two periods before and after the crisis 
separately. Regressions were therefore run for the period 1995:1-2003:1 and for the 
period after the currency crisis 1999:1-2003:1. Also a more pragmatic approach 
following King and Levine (1993) and Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) was taken. 
Their approach is not based on a particular theoretical growth model but uses as 
explanatory variables a set of those that have been found statistically significant in 
previous growth studies.
10 All of these are essentially control variables in estimating 
the coefficient of primary interest, which is that of each of the discussed financial 
development indicators, where one equation is estimated for each indicator. For 
Russia data availability allowed to use government size (proxied by the log of the 
ratio of consolidated government expenditures to GDP), the CPI inflation rate, and 
openness to trade (proxied by the log of the sum of the ratios of exports and imports 
to GDP). Additional explanatory variables were successively included that may 
have been important growth determinants during transition, namely the log of the 
share of industry in GDP as an indicator of structural difficulties, the ratio of the 
fiscal balance to GDP, the log of the real exchange rate, and the log of the US-
Dollar oil price.  
 
Tests for stationarity of the variables involved suggested that for the period 1995-
2003 almost all of them should be differenced once in order to become stationary 
(Table 4). Hence, the dependent variable in the equations for 1995-2003 was 
differenced log real per capita GDP (the growth rate of real per capita GDP). 
However, for the period since 1999 almost all potential explanatory variables 




Tests for unit roots of variables used in regressions 
 
 
The main results of the estimations for the two periods are shown in Table 5. For 
the two periods “base” regressions (equations 1 and 3) were defined that included 
those explanatory variables that were found to be consistently statistically 
                                                           
10 These include initial per capita GDP and the initial level of educational attainment (such as school 
enrolment), variables that control for economic policies such as measures of government size, 
inflation, the black market exchange rate premium, and openness to international trade, and also 
variables that measure political stability and ethnic diversity. 
11 Of course, the limited number of observations particularly concerning the period 1999-2003 is a 
serious qualification not only for these tests but for the entire simulation analysis. It suggests to 
repeat these regressions in future with more data and also to perform a cross-section analysis.     11
significant and relatively robust to the inclusion of other independent variables.
12 
Regarding the period 1995-2003 (equation 1), these explanatory variables were the 
dummy variable for the structural break in 1998:3
13, the ratio of the fiscal balance to 
GDP, and the growth rates of the investment share in GDP and of the real exchange 
rate. Growth of the oil price was also included in this base regression (equation 1) 
despite its insignificance, because it was mostly statistically significant in the 
robustness tests. Owing to time lags involved that could be longer than the quarterly 
frequency used, it was expected that using lagged explanatory variables would yield 
better estimation results. Tests with different time lags suggested, however, that 
only the real exchange rate in addition to the financial indicators discussed below 
appeared to influence growth with a lag of more than a quarter.
14 Hence, these 
variables were lagged. All explanatory variables had the expected sign, i.e. 
increases in the investment share and in the oil price promoted economic growth, 
whereas real currency appreciation, rising fiscal deficits, and of course the currency 
crisis were detrimental to growth. In the equations for the shorter period since 1999 
only two explanatory variables were consistently statistically significant and robust, 




Economic growth regression results  
 
 
Both base regressions (equation 1 and 3) had a relatively good forecast quality as 
judged by the root mean squared error and by a visual evaluation of the fitted real 
GDP development. Using Theil’s inequality coefficient (Table 5, last column), an 
excellent forecast quality had the regression for the shorter period since 1999 
(equation 3).  
 
Following King and Levine (1993) and Levine et al. (2000), the two base equations 
were augmented with the financial indicators. Specifically, a composite financial 
indicator was used, which gives the individual indicators equal weight.
15 As shown 
in Table 5, equations 2 and 8, this resulted in a considerable improvement of the 
overall quality of the estimated base equations 1 and 3, including a substantially 
higher adjusted R
2, an improved D.W. statistic, higher significance of most 
                                                           
12 Also, the estimated coefficient values of these variables appeared to be more robust than the 
coefficient values of the other potential explanatory variables.  
13It takes the value of one since third quarter of 1998 and zero otherwise. 
14 Especially investment but also the oil price could have been expected to affect growth with longer 
lags. Regarding investment an explanation why this was not found here could be that at least for the 
period since 1999 the strong investment growth since then was concentrated in the oil, gas and 
metals industries (Hanson, 2003, p. 367), and these investments may have been largely capacity 
increasing allowing increases in production in the same quarter. 
15 Each of the four indicators was transformed into an index set to 1 for December 1994 and these 
four indices were multiplied by 0.25 and then added.    12
explanatory variables, and the composite financial indicator had the expected 
positive sign and was highly statistically significant.
16 With regard to the shorter 
period since 1999, table 5 shows that the estimated coefficients of the individual 
financial indicators were consistently positive and significant (equations 4-7), 
which was, however, not the case with regard to the longer period since 1995.  
 
A major question concerning these results is, of course, the potential endogeneity of 
the explanatory variables, in particular of the financial development indicators. 
Although subject to the qualifications already mentioned there are three arguments, 
which may support the estimations here: 
Firstly, the cross-section studies by King and Levine (1993) and Levine et al. 
(2000) found that for their large country sample and long period examined, 
financial development is leading economic growth. They based this conclusion 
mainly on an examination of the relationship between initial values of financial 
development and subsequent economic growth and on dynamic panel estimates, 
which use the GMM estimators and instruments (to deal with the endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables), where they tested the validity of these instruments before 
using them. It is difficult to believe that what has been found for so many countries 
may work differently in the Russian case, especially also considering the causality 
test results for Russia reported below. 
Secondly, a formal test for endogeneity of the financial development indicators and 
other variables, which could potentially be endogenous in the regressions for 
Russia, the Hausman specification test, was performed. All explanatory variables, 
except the oil price and the dummy variable for the structural break, which may be 
considered to be exogenous, were included as potentially endogenous variables in 
the test.
17 For the period 1995-2003, the null hypothesis that there is no simultaneity 
(i.e. that the estimated coefficients of the residuals are jointly equal to zero) was not 
rejected at the 5 percent level.
18 For the period 1999-2003 it was rejected,
19 
                                                           
16 The individual financial indicators were also used. However, in the regression for the longer 
period 1995-2003 the coefficients and significance of the first differences of all financial indicators 
were fragile in robustness tests and especially financial indicators 2 and 3 were consistently 
statistically insignificant with an often changing estimated sign.  
17 The test was performed for the longer and for the shorter period and for the case that there are 
several endogenous variables. It consists of two steps: First, regressions were run of each of the 
potentially endogenous regressors (i.e. the composite financial indicator and, in the case of the 
period 1995-2003 the differenced variables log (I/GDP), log (REXR)t-2, and FB/GDP, and, in the 
case of the period 1999-2003, log (I/GDP) on all other explanatory variables. Thus there were four 
equations estimated for the period 1995-2003 obtaining four residuals and two equations estimated 
for the period 1999-2003 obtaining two residuals. For the period 1995-2003 the four residuals were 
then used as additional explanatory variables in a regression of the growth rate of real per capita 
GDP on the actual composite financial indicator values and for the period 1999-2003 the respective 
two residuals were used as additional regressors in a regression of the log real per capita GDP on the 
actual composite financial indicator values (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1990, p. 304). An F-test was 
used to test the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients of the residuals are jointly equal to 
zero. If they are, there is no simultaneity.  
18 The F-statistic (4,23) was 2.74, which is below the critical value at 5% significance of 2.80. 
19 The F-statistic (2,13) was 25.79, way above any critical value.    13
although when performing the test assuming that log(I/GDP) is exogenous, 
simultaneity was strongly rejected.  
Thirdly, Granger causality between real per capita GDP developments and financial 
indicators, running in both ways, was tested using different numbers of lagged 
values in the test regressions. They showed that there is always causality running 
from real GDP to financial indicators, which appears natural. But in most of these 
tests causality is also significantly running from financial development to real per 
capita GDP.
20 This may also support the regressions and simulations presented here. 
 
Equations 2 and 8 in table 5, which use the composite financial indicator and have 
the best forecasting power, were used to perform the simulations. Figure 1 shows 
the actual real per capita GDP development and the ex-post forecasts based on the 




Real GDP per capita 1995-2003: Actual and Fitted Values  
 
 
As can be seen, equation 2, table 5, (the regression for the whole period 1995-2003) 
has a relatively good ex-post forecasting quality regarding the earlier period 1995 
until the financial crisis in 1998. Regarding the period since then, equation 8, table 
5, yields a particularly excellent ex-post forecast. Hence, simulations of the growth 
impact of financial development for the period since 1999 should probably be based 
on equations estimated for this period and not earlier. However, for comparison of 
the results both equations were used for the simulations. 
 
b)  Simulations based on growth regressions for Russia 
 
Three simulations of the impact of financial system development on economic 
growth were run: The first assumes that Russia’s financial indicators continued 
their trend improvement before the financial crisis in 1998. As shown in figure 2, 
indicators 1 (financial depth) and 2 (importance of banks relative to central bank) 
were steadily rising in the years 1996-1997. It appears very reasonable to assume 
that this trend would have continued in the absence of the crisis as shown by the 
curves denoted simulation 1.  
                                                           
20 For the quarterly data 1995-2003 the null hypothesis, that the composite financial indicator does 
not Granger cause the log of real per capita GDP, was mostly rejected:          
        Obs.  F-Statistic       Probability for the null         
2 lags in the test regressions:    31  5.337    0.01143                   
3 lags in the test regressions:    30  5.776     0.00427 
and for null hypothesis that the composite financial indicator does not Granger cause the growth rate 
of real per capita GDP:                         
2 lags in the test regressions:     30  5.180     0.01312 








Also indicator 4 (nonfinancial private sector credit to GDP) was rising in 1997 
(Figure 2a) and this increase is assumed to have continued during the years 1998-




Figure 2a   




By contrast, indicator 3 (nonfinancial private sector credit to total credit) decreased 
two years before the crisis. But this development reflected the enormous increase in 
lending by banks to the government relative to their lending to other sectors of the 
economy. Since the government defaulted on its debt in 1998, this decline can be 
interpreted as an early warning signal of the crisis in 1998. It was very closely 
associated with the crisis, which gives this financial indicator a different quality 
compared to the other three indicators. It could be argued that in a scenario that 
assumes absence of the financial crisis this indicator would not have declined 
during 1996 but instead it may have maintained its previous level or perhaps even 
improved as the other indicators did. However, in order to prevent any impression 
that this simulation 1 is based on unrealistically optimistic assumptions regarding 
the hypothetical financial development in the absence of the crisis, a moderate 
steady improvement of this indicator 3 (nonfinancial private sector credit to total 
credit) from its low level in 1997 is assumed for the period 1998-2002 (Figure 2a). 
In the second scenario, simulation 2 in figures 2 and 2a, it is assumed that Russia’s 
financial indicators would have risen linearly during 1998:2-2002:4 to reach the 
average level each indicator had in Hungary and Poland in the year 2002. It should 
be noted that this average level in Hungary and Poland is still modest by 
international comparison. As shown in Table 1 above, with regard to two of the four 
indicators, this level was considerably below the respective average level in the 
group of fast growing countries. Only with regard to indicator 2 (importance of 
banks relative to central bank) the average in Hungary and Poland was higher than 
this benchmark level.  
Finally, the third scenario is a purely illustrative sensitivity analysis. It makes the 
assumption that Russia’s financial indicators rise from 1998:2-2002:4 to the highest 
levels found by Levine et al. (2000) on average during 1960-1995 for a sample of   15
71 countries, which were shown in Table 1, column 5.
21 All scenarios use the index 
of the four financial indicators, which gives them equal weight. Figure 3 presents 
the results in log levels on the basis of the regression for the period 1999-2003 




Actual and simulated evolution of real per-capita GDP 1998-2003 
 
 
The simulated curves obtained when using the regression for the whole period 
1995-2003 (equation 2, table 5) are very similar to the ones on the basis of the 
regression for the period since 1999 shown in Figure 3. For simulations 2 and 3 
they lie slightly above those shown, which means that the regression for the whole 
period forecasts a slightly higher growth impact of these simulated financial 
developments than the regression for the period since 1999. For a clearer exposition 
those results are not shown in figure 3 but all results are reported in table 6.  
In order not to allow the forecast error to influence the calculated impact of the 
simulations on the per capita growth rate, this impact is calculated by comparing 
simulated per capita GDP growth rates with forecasted growth rates on the basis of 
the two regressions.
22  
                                                           
21 Since the authors did not include indicator 3 in their study this scenario is built on indicators 1, 2 
and 4 only. 
22 In other words, only the impact on economic growth, which is solely due to changing the financial 
indicator values, is considered. When using actual growth rates the differences are about 3 
percentage points higher in the three simulations.   16
Table 6 
Impact of simulations of financial market development on Russia’s average annual per 
capita growth rate during 1998-2002 using equations 2 and 8, Table 5: 
Sensitivity analysis:    
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a) Assuming Russia´s financial indicators had continued since 1998:2 their approximate trend improvement 
before the financial crisis in 1998. 
b) Assuming Russia´s financial indicators had increased linearly during 1998:2 until 2002:4 to the respective 
average level achieved by Poland and Hungary in 2002. 
c) It is hypothetically assumed that Russia’s financial indicators 1, 2 and 4 would have increased 
linearly from 1998:2–2002:4 to the maximum levels found on average during 1960-1995 for a group 
of 71 countries by Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000). These levels are shown in Table 1, column 5. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
As can be seen, the simulations predict a considerably higher per capita growth rate 
ex-post than was forecasted on the basis of actual financial development: According 
to simulation 1 the per capita growth rate would have been 1 percentage point 
higher on average during 1998-2002 in each of these five years, had the banking 
crisis not occurred and had financial development continued the trend improvement 
it showed before the crisis. This impact is predicted by both regressions. Simulation 
2 (i.e. Russia reaches average Polish and Hungarian financial development level by 
2002) predicts an even 6.9 percentage points higher average annual growth rate on 
the basis of equation 8, or an impact of 8.1 percentage points on the basis of 
equation 2. And simulation 3, which is an admittedly unrealistic scenario chosen for 
purely illustrative purposes, predicts a theoretical 52-61 percentage points higher 
average annual growth rate. In sum, three main messages result from the 
simulations: Firstly, only considering the adverse effects of the financial crisis of 
1998 on financial development indicators, the loss of economic growth is estimated 
to have been considerable, namely at least at about 1 percentage point on average 
during the years 1998-2002, if simulation 1 is regarded as a “minimum” financial 
development that, in the absence of a financial crisis, would at least have been met. 
Of course, the estimated economic growth loss is larger in the first year, 1999, that 
followed the crisis than in later years. Secondly, Russia’s government could have   17
significantly promoted economic growth by implementing financial reforms that 
would have resulted in increases of the financial indicators. Thirdly, the simulations 
suggest that financial development has a substantial impact on economic growth in 
Russia and thus they are first time evidence for a single country that may 
corroborate the cross-section analyses by King and Levine (1993) and Levine et al. 
(2000).  
 
c)  Results of simulations based on growth coefficients from the literature 
 
For the second approach of estimating the growth impact of Russia’s financial 
crisis, the average growth coefficients estimated by Levine et al. (2000) for a large 





Impact of simulations of financial market development on Russia’s average annual per 











Simulation 1:  Simulation 2:  Simulation 3: 
Indicator  1  0.034 0.009 0.022 0.057 
Indicator  2  0.113 0.020 0.024 0.030 











1)The simulations are described in Table 6 and in the text above. Levine et al. (2000) did not include 
in their estimations indicator 3, which is therefore missing here. The impact on per capita growth is 
calculated by multiplying the growth coefficients with the annual difference between the log of the 
simulated and the log of the actual financial market indicator. Logs need to be used because the 
coefficients were estimated using logs of the financial indicators.  
2) Largest growth coefficients estimated by Levine et al. (2000), Table 3, p. 46, in their regression 
“with full information set” for a sample of 71 countries and for the period 1960-1995. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
The same three simulations are run as before and the results are shown in columns 
2-4: In simulation 1 (which assumes that the trend improvement of the financial 
indicators before the financial crisis of 1998 would have continued after the crisis), 
the average annual real per capita GDP growth rate during 1998-2002 would have 
been 1 percentage point higher than it actually was (column 1). Surprisingly, this 
result is exactly the same as found in the previous section (i.e. using the two 
regressions for Russia).  
In simulation 2 (i.e. the catch up during 1998-2002 to the average Hungarian and 
Polish financial development level) the annual per capita growth rate would have 
been 2.2 percentage points higher. Although still sizable, this result is, however, 4 
times smaller than the result above. And in simulation 3 (i.e. the illustrative 
                                                           
23 The coefficients were estimated by the authors only for indicators 1, 2 and 4.   18
scenario where Russia’s financial development reaches by 2002 those highest 
worldwide financial development levels) the growth rate difference would have 
been 4.9 percentage points each year, which is 10 times smaller than the estimated 
impact above. Thus, only for simulations that use relatively small deviations of 
hypothetical from actual financial development do these approaches yield the same 
result. The larger the deviation of hypothetical financial development to actual one, 
the larger will also be the difference between the forecasted average annual growth 
rates in the approach that is based on regressions for Russia compared to the 
approach that uses estimated average financial growth coefficients for a large set of 
countries. Or, in other words, the simulations based on growth coefficients from the 
literature yield a progressively lower impact of financial development on per capita 
growth when raising the assumed financial development indicators than the 
simulations based on regressions for Russia. However, this may not be an 
inconsistency: Since the growth coefficients from the literature are averages for a 
large country sample and a long time period, it is possible that behind this average 
exists a large and unknown deviation between the largest and lowest coefficient for 
individual countries. The coefficients estimated above for Russia could be 
comparable to relatively large invisible coefficients. Other factors that may be 
important are that Russia’s circumstances during transition may have been different 
than those average circumstances during the 35 year period used by Levine et al. 
(2000) and that the latter derived their result by using a large set of statistically 
significant explanatory variables, most of whom were either not significant or not 
available in the Russian case.  
In sum, the analysis shows that irrespective of the estimation approach, simulation 
1 (the trend improvement of the financial indicators before the financial crisis of 
1998 would have continued after the crisis) yields an economic growth impact of 1 
percentage point each year, and in simulation 2 (financial indicators catch up during 
1998-2002 to the average Hungarian and Polish financial development level) the 
minimum estimated growth impact amounts to 2.2 percentage points each year. 
This corroborates the hypothesis for financial development in Russia to have a 
considerable effect on economic growth and, thus, all reforms that raise the 
financial development indicators would also considerably promote economic 
growth. 
 
5 Concluding  remarks 
 
Russia’s banking crisis showed that assessments of the progress made in banking 
supervision, in improving the legal and regulatory framework and in its 
enforcement had been overly optimistic. Together with the crisis banking sector 
reform and supervision even deteriorated and for several years the sector was left 
largely on its own with supervisory authorities not even able or willing to close 
institutions whose license was revoked. Given these deficiencies and the large 
empirical literature on banking crises which argues that not implementing structural 
reforms in the banking sector after a crisis very likely raises the economic damage 
caused by the crisis, one may expect that Russia’s banking crisis and the response   19
of the authorities to it had a pronounced adverse impact on economic growth 
despite the very good actual economic performance. The evidence found in this 
paper, which is subject to a number of qualifications owing to the limited time 
length and data availability, may support this view. The impact during 1998-2002 
on the average annual per capita growth rate is estimated to have been at least 1 
percentage point irrespective of whether the simulations are based on growth 
regressions for Russia or on the estimated average long run impact of financial 
development on growth for a large country sample in a recent cross-section study 
that specifically addresses the problem of causality. This identical result of two 
independent studies could be interpreted as an indication of the meaningfulness of 
the studies. Assuming that in the absence of the crisis, Russia’s financial 
development would have been very strong to reach the average development level 
in Hungary and Poland, the annual growth impact of the crisis may have amounted 
to at least 2.2 up to 7 percentage points. Although this scenario is illustrative only 
such a significant impact of financial development on per capita growth may call 
for a reconsideration of the hypothesis that the financial sector in Russia, whose 
development is still very considerably lagging behind other advanced transition 
countries, may not be of great importance for macroeconomic stability and 
development. Thus, the finding corroborates those studies that argue for the 
importance of financial system development in promoting growth in transition 
countries.   20
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Appendix A: Background of the Russian crisis in 1998 and the repetition of 
some of the mistakes that were leading to the crisis.  
 
At the end of 1997 an evaluation of the progress toward “a market-based financial 
system” in the 15 successor states of the former Soviet-Union was published.
24 The 
high ranking that Russia received in this assessment apparently was overly 
optimistic, particularly with regard to banking supervision. The most fundamental 
prudential rules for banking had not been enforced before the crisis, in particular 
regarding the foreign exchange rate risk and provisioning for bad debt. This 
together with a rapidly growing public debt to GDP ratio on account of issuance of 
short- and medium-term high interest yielding treasury bills (GKO/OFZ debt), sold 
to a large extent to commercial banks
25, caused three major weaknesses in the 
latter’s aggregate balance sheet and in their off-balance sheet transactions: Banks 
were overexposed to the foreign exchange rate risk, to the credit risk (aggravated, 
for instance, by a Ruble depreciation, which could cause borrowers with foreign 
debt and no foreign currency income to become insolvent) and to the risk of default 
of the government.
26 Thus, the large currency depreciation in August/September 
1998 and the government’s default on its domestic Ruble debt in August 1998 
became instantaneously an open banking crisis. It caused the transitory collapse of 
the payments system and, to some extent, of new lending. 
 
A very important contributory factor to the crisis has been (as in several other Asian 
and Eastern European countries who experienced a currency crisis during 1997 and 
1998) the fixed exchange rate corridor (adopted in the beginning of 1998) backed 
by IMF lending. Given Russia’s little diversified export structure, considering the 
slow structural reform progress and other adverse developments such as the fall of 
oil prices and withdrawal of foreign investors from emerging markets, it proved to 
be a fundamental mistake.
27 This promise of relative nominal exchange rate 
                                                           
24 The study distinguished six functional areas of ”central banking reforms”: Monetary operations 
and government securities markets, foreign exchange operations and market, banking supervision, 
bank restructuring, payments system, and central bank accounting and internal audit. Marks from 1 
(indicating limited progress) to 3 (indicating substantial progress) for each of these reform areas 
were given and for an overall ranking. Russia received a mark of 3 with regard to the three first 
mentioned areas and a mark of 2 for the three last mentioned areas. See Knight et al. (1997). 
25 The share of credit to the government in bank’s total assets had steadily increased from about 5 
percent at end of 1994 to about one third at end June 1998, mostly treasury bills (see Table 1).  
26 This corresponds to the findings of a ”due diligence survey” of 18 Russian banks (15 of which 
were among the 30 largest Russian banks), performed by the World Bank in the second half of 1998: 
14 of these 18 banks had a negative own capital! The losses incurred by the 18 banks were identified 
as having been loan losses (45 percent of the aggregate loss), foreign exchange related losses (37 
percent) and losses on government debt (18 percent). The large state-owned Sberbank was not 
reviewed. See Russian European Center for Economic Policy (1999), p. 84. 
27 Most analyses agree that the exchange rate policy has been crucially flawed. See, among others, 
Welfens (1999), Roubini and Wachtel (1998), Dornbusch (2001), Chapman and Mulino (2001).  In 
this respect the Russian devaluation and banking crisis of August/September 1998 is very similar to   25
stability with lax enforcement of prudential requirements for banks contributed 
decisively to the overexposure of banks to the exchange rate risk: For banks it thus 
appeared profitable to borrow at relatively low foreign interest rates (foreign 
currency debt amounted to about 30% of bank’s balance sheet total, Table A1), lend 
at high domestic interest rates and to enter into unhedged off-balance sheet currency 
forward contracts. Not considering off-balance sheet items, Table 1 shows that just 
prior to the crisis the open foreign currency position amounted to about 18 percent 
of the balance sheet total. This open position may have even been larger when those 
foreign assets are excluded that were reported to have been diverted funds from 
IMF loans.
28 The risky lending to the government (mostly T-bills) had increased to 
one third of the balance sheet total. 
 
Table A1: 
Russia: Consolidated balance sheet of commercial banks at the eve of the currency 
and banking crisis (at end June 1998) 
Assets  bn Rubel  in percent  Liabilities  bn Rubel  in percent 
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     Capital accounts  156.2 25.0 
Total  624.1 100.0  Total  624.1 100.0 
Memorandum item: 
In percent of GDP: 
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Source: Central Bank of Russia (2001).  
 
Nevertheless, some authors (e.g. Buchs, 1999) did not regard the flawed exchange 
rate policy to have been one root cause of the crisis but rather the dramatic decline 
in tax revenues between 1992 and 1997 (from above 16% to 9.3% of GDP) and the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
the crises experienced in 1997 by several East-Asian countries casting doubt on the policy advise the 
countries received from western institutions.  
28 By definition IMF loans are supposed to increase the international reserves of the central bank and 
should not be passed on to commercial banks. Italian newspapers cited in October 1999 analyses 
performed by Russian judicial authorities which found that during the three months just prior to the 
currency crisis in 1998 a very substantial fraction of IMF loans (about several billion US-Dollars) 
had been diverted to Russian commercial banks.   26
large fiscal deficits. Buchs argued that they were the primary cause for the very 
high real interest rates on loans and treasury bills especially since 1996 until the 
crisis making fiscal policy not only vulnerable but unsustainable and attracting 
relatively large speculative short-term capital inflows. Buchs also argued that the 
Russian crisis was a typical example of crisis contagion and that its timing was 
caused by the Asian currency crisis. The real interest rate level is of particular 
importance here, because empirical studies found it to be the only variable, which is 
a consistently highly statistically significant determinant of both banking crises and 
of the costs of banking crises (e.g. Barth et al., 2000, Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2000). In contrast to Buchs it may, however, also be argued that with a 
different exchange rate policy, i.e. a flexible exchange rate, and assuming that 
market participants could not have speculated on IMF lending to support an 
overvalued exchange rate, real interest rates on loans may never have climbed to 
their high and long lasting levels and the government would have been forced 
earlier to consider its solvency. The reason for this view is that under a flexible 
exchange rate regime the deteriorating solvency of the government is likely to have 
caused upward pressure on the exchange rate and thus on inflation, which would 
have forced market participants and the government to reduce the risks involved. It 
may be precisely the prevention of these market forces in the first place through the 
promise of a relatively stable exchange rate backed by IMF lending to uphold an 
unsustainable exchange rate, which allowed the government to continue its 
borrowing policy and banks to increase their risk exposure. In other words, had the 
exchange rate policy been different, the increasing underlying risks may have 
become apparent and corrected much earlier without a sudden extremely large 
currency devaluation.
29 Figure 1 shows that in the beginning of 2003, i.e. three 
years after strong capital investment during 2000-2002 associated with a drastic 
reduction in capital flight, the real exchange rate was still about one quarter below 
its level before the crisis and real interest rates have been rather moderate on 
average during this time. At least ex-post this may corroborate the many voices that 
argued during 1996 and 1997 that the currency was overvalued and that real interest 
rates were at a dangerously high level, views which were discredited by the IMF as 




As a starting point to assess the immediate effects of the currency and banking 
crisis, Table A1a shows the (official) aggregate balance sheet of commercial banks 
at end 1998 in constant Rubels of June 1998 allowing to evaluate the impact on the 
                                                           
29 This is also true with regard to the Asian currency crisis, see Dornbusch (2001). Roubini and 
Wachtel (1998) argued that IMF loans are often a signal of unsustainable current account 
imbalances. Therefore it is surprising that among the many indicators tested in the most prominent 
study on early warning signals of currency crises, IMF loans were not included in the list of 
potential candidates. See Kaminsky, M., Lizondo, and C. Reinhardt (1998).    27
real credit, real deposit holdings, and real own capital of banks by eliminating the 
distortionary effect of the surge of inflation that followed the crisis.  
 
Table A1a: 
Russia: Consolidated balance sheet of commercial banks after the currency crisis at end 
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    Other items  -11,1 -2,1 -65,8
    Capital accounts  88,9 16,9 -43,1
Total  526,5 100,0 -15,6 Total  526,5 100,0 -15,6
a) Percentage change of the respective asset or liability in real terms during July and December 
1998. 
Source: Central Bank of Russia (2001); nominal figures were deflated using the respective increase 
in the CPI. 
 
It thus becomes clear that the central bank initially bore the major burden of 
stabilizing the banking system since it increased its lending to commercial banks in 
the 6 months after June 1998 by three times in real terms. This, of course, meant 
that the success in reducing base money growth to an annualized 11% during 
January-August 1998 came to an abrupt end. (Growth of base money exploded to an 
annualized 72% during August-December 1998, and it grew by 54% during 1999 
and 60% in 2000). CPI inflation exploded from an annualized 7.2% during the first 
7 months of 1998 to an annualized 185% during August–December 1998, falling 
thereafter continuously to below 10% in early 2003.
30  
 
The rise of inflation and run on deposits caused drastic declines in real Rubel 
denominated deposits and in real own capital of banks, which are even understated 
                                                           
30 Despite the initial inflation surge measures of the real effective exchange rate increased only 
relatively moderately since 1999 because of nominal currency depreciation (figureA1).    28
with regard to most banks. The reason is that due to a lack of published 
disaggregated data, the balance sheets shown here include the relatively large 
Sberbank (Russia´s state savings bank), which was regarded as relatively save by 
depositors since it was the only bank whose deposits were insured by the 
government, and thus there was a major shift in deposits from commercial banks to 
the Sberbank.
31 Table A1a shows also that foreign assets of banks increased by 70% 
in real terms, which appears surprisingly low and thus suggests the disappearance of 
a considerable amount of foreign assets if one considers that the real currency 
devaluation during this six month period amounted to 88% and if one assumes that 
some of the alleged large transfer of foreign assets just before the crisis to banks 
occurred.
32  
Table A1a also shows a credit crunch. However, many observers will argue that 
since lending to the private sector and other enterprises was relatively small -
amounting to about 40% of banks’ balance sheet total and less than 12% of GDP in 
1998- the adverse impact of the credit crunch on the economy may have been 
muted. But this ratio -as other financial indicators- was rising before the crisis, and 
the crisis reversed this improving trend, so that a consideration of the growth impact 
should take into account the potential further improvement of these indicators in the 
absence of a crisis as is done in the simulations below.  
 
About three years after the currency crisis (in mid 2001) banks had reduced further 
their risk exposure to the government and to foreign exchange rate changes.
33 The 
shares of deposits and own capital recovered somewhat and particularly real lending 
to the private sector rose again. However, for two reasons this mid 2001 situation is 
mentioned: until about this time real lending to commercial banks by the central 
bank strongly accelerated (its level reached 600% in real terms compared to June 
1998 and almost 10% of banks’ balance sheet total) although banks were not forced 
into restructuring through a comprehensive banking restructuring program in 
exchange for this support. And, secondly, the open foreign currency position started 
to widen again after 2001. In early 2003 it had almost reached its pre-crisis level 
                                                           
31 During August 1998 and May 1999 about 60 percent of Ruble deposits at commercial banks 
excluding the Sberbank were transferred to the Sberbank. The latter´s share in total Ruble 
denominated deposits increased from close to 80 percent before the crisis to nearly 90 percent in 
Summer 1999. While Ruble depositors incurred real losses mainly due to inflation, foreign currency 
depositors incurred losses due to the following reasons: when these deposits were transferred to the 
Sberbank, they were converted into Rubles using the exchange rate of September 1, 1998. When 
they were not transferred, in many instances the banks were not able to repay them. Several banks 
engaged in asset stripping. A popular method of this practice has been the establishment of new 
banks that took over assets but not liabilities. This, of course, demonstrates poor banking 
supervision, lacking property rights and weak law enforcement. 
32 The long process of “asset stripping”, which caused also enormous losses on the part of foreign 
capital providers under the eye of supervisors and the IMF is assessed in MFK Renaissance Capital 
(2000), pp. 6-9.  
33 The share of claims against the government in total assets decreased from one third to 23% and 
the open foreign currency position (neglecting off-balance sheet items) fell from 18% to 7% of the 
balance sheet total (for reasons of space the corresponding balance sheet is not shown).   29
(Table A1b), indicating that since 2001 banks are repeating a fundamental mistake 
once again: This is inconsistent with an improved banking supervision.  
 
Table A1b: 
Russia: Consolidated balance sheet of commercial banks at end February 2003 in constant 
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    Other items  -43.7 -4.6 35.3
    Capital accounts  211.8 22.1 35.6
Total  959.3 100.0 53.7 Total  959.3 100.0 53.7
a) Percentage change of the respective asset or liability in real terms during July 1998 and February 
2003. 
Source: Central Bank of Russia (2003); nominal figures were deflated using the respective increase 
in the CPI. 
 
Thus, despite the strong economic recovery since 1999, which resulted in 
improvements in real lending, deposit taking and in a recovery of own capital, the 
banking system is still highly vulnerable to a macroeconomic adverse shock. This 
was also confirmed by a “stress test” analysis performed by a joint World Bank and 
IMF study group (IMF, 2003). These tests show that a large adverse shock similar 
to the one experienced in 1998 but excluding the possibility of yet another 
government default, would have an impact on banks’ balance sheets of about 3-5% 
of GDP. Since such an event is likely to be associated with a loss of confidence, 
deposit withdrawals and thus further pressure on the banking system, and 
considering that the ratio of stated own capital to GDP in early 2003 amounted to 
about 8% of GDP, the high vulnerability of the banking system becomes obvious.  
 
In the absence of any significant banking sector reform since the currency crisis, the 
danger is that the moderate recovery of the banking sector in the wake of the 
increase in real production covers up an underlying poor banking sector 
performance, which may impose high costs on Russia´s long term economic   30
development. This is especially true if financial market development does not 
simply follow economic growth but “exerts a first-order influence” on it and is a 
good predictor of future growth (King and Levine, 1993, Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 
2000).  
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Appendix B:  Policy options for improving financial development 
 
a)  Weaknesses of western prudential regulation 
 
Even without the banking crisis in 1998, Russia’s financial system has been 
unstable and not been able to fulfill its functions. Improvements of the regulation of 
the financial system prior and since the crisis have been insufficient. The important 
point is, however, that even had there been a fully enforced prudential regulation of 
Russia’s financial system according to western standards, the crisis may not have 
been averted: 
Western prudential regulation centers around the capital adequacy rule according to 
the BIS (1988, 1996, 2003) definition (updated Cook ratio). This rule determines 
that the ratio of own capital of a bank to its risk-weighted on and off-balance sheet 
assets needs to be no less than 8 percent, where own capital is defined as equity and 
retained earnings (core capital or tier I capital) plus certain financial instruments 
bearing characteristics that make them similar to equity (subordinated debt or tier II 
capital and also, since 1998, tier III capital). Although the capital adequacy rules are 
regularly revised in an attempt to consider the changing spectrum of risks and risk 
mitigating techniques in banking, there are currently still considerable drawbacks of 
the updated Cooke ratio. Some of them are addressed in the recent proposals for a 
new capital adequacy framework “Basel II” (BIS 1999, 2003). However, it may 
take considerable time until compromise on this proposal is reached and it also has 
substantial drawbacks (some of them are described in Adamson et al., 1999). 
The problems begin with the definition of own capital, which is even not intended 
to be changed. The recognition of (even short-term) subordinated debt (up to certain 
limits) as own capital may not contribute to promote stability of the banking 
system: In case of, for instance, successive adverse shocks to a bank the latter’s 
capital costs are likely to increase. Especially in transition and other emerging 
market economies this increase could be very substantial even to the point that it 
would not be possible to raise additional capital.  
With regard to consideration of market risks in the required capital ratio, portfolio 
diversification of a bank and the interest rate risk are considered with regard to the 
trading book of a bank (financial assets intentionally held for short-term purposes) 
and not with regard to the banking book
34. In addition, although there have been 
improvements regarding consideration of risk-increasing and risk-mitigating effects 
of off-balance sheet transactions, the mitigating effects are considered only 
rudimentarily. Several approaches for improvement are suggested in the BIS (1999, 
2003) reform proposals which, owing to their complex nature, are likely to require 
considerable time until a compromise is implemented.
35  
Regarding credit risk it is also widely acknowledged that the current risk weighting 
of assets is too crude to be a satisfactory measure. Currently, the main determinants 
                                                           
34 The recent 1999 and 2003 BIS proposal suggests to consider explicitly interest rate risks in the 
banking book for those banks where these risks are significantly above average.  
35 Currently, it is envisaged that new rules are introduced by the end of  2006.   32
of risk weighting are the distinction between OECD and non-OECD countries on 
the one hand, and between governments, banks, and other entities, on the other. For 
instance, claims with maturity of up to one year on banks incorporated in non-
OECD countries, such as Russia, carry a risk weight of only 20 percent, (i.e. a 
capital charge of only 1,6 percent of such loans is levied). Non-OECD central 
governments are assigned a risk weight of zero percent (if the claim is denominated 
and funded in the respective national currency) or 100 percent (all other cases). 
Claims on banks from non-OECD countries with a maturity of over one year are 
assigned a risk weight of 100 percent (equivalent to a capital charge of 8 percent).  
Given the arbitrariness of these assignments it is proposed to replace the current 
risk weighting with credit ratings (BIS 1999, 2003). The fundamental merit of this 
could be to make capital charges more sensitive to actual credit risk. However, it 
leaves in place a system of arbitrary asset allocation and capital charges: The 
proposed jumps in risk weights from one rating level to a higher or lower level are 
considerable. In addition, crucial still unanswered questions, which are very 
relevant for countries like Russia, concern the effects of a sudden downgrading of 
ratings during a crisis, the quality of the assessments of rating agencies, the 
selection of eligible agencies, and to what extent the behavior of these agencies is 
affected (and potential new conflicts of interest are created) should such a system 
come into effect. Another problem of the proposal appears to be that unrated banks, 
corporates and sovereigns receive a much lower risk weight than entities with a 
poor rating. This could provide incentives not to receive a rating. 
  
b)  Could the banking crisis of August 1998 have been prevented had western 
  prudential regulation for banks been enforced? 
 
Given the apprehensions about some aspects of the proposed reform of the capital 
adequacy framework and given the uncertainty regarding its implementation, it may 
not be warranted currently to rely on it as the new western model of prudential 
regulation. Using then the current capital adequacy framework it appears that 
several of its weaknesses, in particular a weak definition of capital, unsatisfactory 
consideration of portfolio diversification, interest rate risk and credit risk in the 
banking book, and unsatisfactory consideration of liquidity and operational risks, 
are more pronounced during transition. This is because of the mentioned legal and 
institutional imperfections, the higher volatility of macroeconomic variables and the 
solvency problem of the government. 
For instance, under this current framework and assuming that national supervisors 
do not impose further restrictions, banks would not need to back up credit to the 
Russian government denominated and funded in Rubel with own capital. Hence, 
under this regulation the default of the Russian government on a substantial part of 
its debt (as occurred in August/September 1998) consumes own capital of banks 
holding such debt. However, this own capital is needed as a buffer for other risks. 
Secondly, although western prudential regulation would have limited banks’ open 
foreign exchange positions, thus limiting banks’ direct losses from the large 
currency depreciation shock, it may not have provided sufficient protection against   33
the decline of the quality of the loan portfolio of the banking sector that is likely to 
be associated with a large currency devaluation, i.e. against the rise of the aggregate 
share of non-performing loans: Under a large currency devaluation this decline may 
be substantial if the institutional infrastructure does not facilitate structural change 
on the enterprise level. It takes time for the economy to adjust to a devaluation and 
to benefit from it, so that initially adverse effects on production dominate. In 
addition, even those sectors of the economy that may instantaneously benefit from 
the devaluation are unlikely in an unstable situation to increase their deposits at 
banks. Rather they may join other economic agents in attempting to shift deposits 
out of banks to assets considered to be save. Thus, the adverse effect on banks’ 
aggregate balance sheet and profitability caused by those sectors of the economy 
that are initially hurt by the devaluation (and that face liquidity problems, become a 
higher risk and require more intense monitoring) is likely to dominate potential 
favorable effects on banks’ balance sheets and profitability caused by sectors that 
benefit from the devaluation. As a result, initially after a large devaluation, 
increased losses on loans and deposit withdrawals are likely. If, under the 
assumption of enforced western prudential regulation, banks react to this with 
increased credit rationing, the credit crunch would intensify and production would 
even be more adversely affected. In sum, even under western prudential regulation 
and even under the new proposed Basel II capital adequacy framework, stability of 
the financial system in a situation of large currency depreciation can prove to be 
difficult to be maintained.  
 
c)  Adaptation of some western prudential rules 
 
Concerning capital adequacy, several authors argued that capital-asset ratios in 
transition countries should be higher than in industrial countries (e.g. Goldstein, 
1997). Others argued that it would be unrealistic to recommend a more demanding 
standard (e.g. Steinherr, 1994 and 1997) and that the additional costs of such higher 
capital requirement would put banks in transition countries at a disadvantage; it 
could dampen lending and restrict entry into banking.  
There are reservations to the view that transition countries should not put 
themselves at a disadvantage to industrial countries by adopting stricter capital 
regulations. On the one hand and considering the short run, it may occur that higher 
capital requirements have a dampening effect on bank lending. With regard to 
industrial countries there is, however, little empirical evidence for this assumption 
(Jackson, 1999). On the other hand, and adopting a medium and long-term view, 
capital requirements contribute to financial stability and thus their effect on 
economic growth may be positive. Given the often still very low money demand 
regarding bank deposits in transition countries, particularly in Russia, deposit 
growth and thus more lending, not less, due to improved stability of banks may 
occur. The quality of lending could also be improved if excessive risk taking would 
be dampened through capital requirements. Given, however, that in Russia   34
particularly capital adequacy is likely to continue to be difficult to enforce
36, if only 
due to the asset valuation problem in the absence of IAS, reserve requirements need 
to remain relatively high and unremunerated, so as to indirectly enforce capital 
adequacy through relatively high cost of deposits.  
Unremuneration of reserve requirements appears also warranted as an insurance 
premium for implicit or explicit guarantees the central bank should extend 
(Steinherr and Gilibert, 1994). These guarantees should include the lender of last 
resort function, provision of liquidity, and provision of deposit insurance (capped 
and partial, and perhaps existing only as long as it takes to establish a private 
insurance with regulatory oversight).  
Regarding the risk weights in the capital asset ratio, the default of the Russian 
government on a part of its debt made clear that the weight for government debt 
(even if denominated and funded in domestic currency) cannot remain low. 
Arguments that this weight may be lower than 100 percent for Russian government 
debt appear difficult to justify. Analogously, the risk weight for bank debt would 
have to be raised. A weight less than 100 percent appears warranted only for such 
bank debt that is short-term and incurred by a bank who’s creditworthiness is 
proven, for instance, by quarterly publication of financial statements that meet 
western standards. A large increase in these weights would, of course, only increase 
pressure on banks to raise their own capital ratio.  
Regarding the limitation of interest rate risk, the current BIS rules should be 
adapted so that capital requirements apply to all maturity weighted asset-liability 
imbalances. The BIS (1999, 2003) proposal to levy an interest rate risk capital 
charge only for banks where interest rate risk is significantly above average, 
appears not to be adequate for Russia, since interest rate volatility is large and 
management capacity scarce (Steinherr and Gilibert, 1994). 
Also risk diversification rules need to be adjusted so that not only the risk 
increasing effects of on-balance and off-balance sheet transactions on the exposure 
of a bank to individual borrowers, group of borrowers, and sectors of the economy 
are considered and limited with regard to the own capital of the bank but also, to the 
extent possible, the risk diminishing effects of off-balance sheet transactions. 
Explicit consideration of other risks in prudential regulation (such as operational, 
reputational, and legal risks) would, on the one hand, demonstrate how the legal, 
institutional and other imperfections burden financial intermediation while, on the 
other hand, it would provide a buffer for banks against these risks. Given their 
difficult quantification, supervisory authorities need to make a qualitative 
judgement in assessing them. 
As to equity investments of banks in non-financial enterprises the difficulty to find 
qualified participants willing to exert effective corporate governance may argue for 
a liberal regulation enabling banks to hold substantial investments. For instance, 
such investments could be limited to 20 percent of the non-financial enterprise’s 
                                                           
36 The current minimum capital requirement amounts to 8 to 9 percent, depending on the size of the 
bank.   35
own capital with an even larger share permitted if the holding is transitory.
37 When 
allowing banks to hold substantial investments in non-financial enterprises, 
governance of bank managements becomes an even more crucial issue than it 
already is. Steinherr and Gilibert (1994) proposed to reserve seats on a bank’s 
supervisory board to the government, the central bank, a foreign auditing firm 
having no relationship with the bank, and to provide incentives to pension and 
investment funds to invest in banks and to acquire a board seat. In addition, they 
proposed that the government could retain a minority share in banks. The main 
disadvantages of this proposal are potential conflicts of interest on the part of the 
government and central bank. Solvency problems of the government may increase 
such conflicts so that particularly regarding Russia it may be preferable not to 
involve the government. Whether the proposal could make it more difficult to 
attract foreigners to invest in Russian banks -which appears to be a sine qua non for 
improving Russia’s banking system- is not obvious, since foreign investors may not 
necessarily consider the presence of the government and central bank as a 
hindrance. Assuming that the participation of the government is dropped from the 
proposal its main advantage appears to be an almost certain increase in quality of 
the supervision of bank managements.  
 
In sum, Russia should adapt the current western capital adequacy framework so as 
to narrow the definition of own capital of banks and improve the consideration of 
credit risk, interest rate risk, portfolio diversification, and liquidity and operational 
risks. On the other hand, relatively liberal rules regarding equity investments of 
banks could apply while at the same time improving banks’ governance for instance 
through rules concerning the supervisory board of a bank. 
 
d)  Adoption of a bank restructuring approach that is comprehensive 
 
But another major concern is that the Russian banking reform process so far was 
not comprehensive as in the described relatively successful Polish and Hungarian 
banking reform programs: Enforcement of an improved ”bank restructuring law”, 
where ambiguities are avoided and relatively rapid court conciliations promoted 
could contribute to an effective reduction of the stock and flow of bad debt. The 
probability for survival of a bank should not be dependent on either the funds 
provided by the government for recapitalization or the order in which banks are 
reviewed by supervisory authorities. Giving foreign banks and international 
auditing firms an explicit role in the restructuring process would also contribute to 
efficient restructuring. It should also be considered that not the central bank but the 
government should be at the forefront of bank restructuring. The postponement of 
the introduction of the IAS to an indefinite time in future is another serious 
problem. And finally, the postponement of a reform with regard to the monopoly-
like state-owned Sberbank is an important hindrance to improving the healthiness of 
                                                           
37 If a bank claims the holding to be transitory, the latter would have to be sold within a certain 
period.   36
the banking system. Given Sberbank’s size and regional importance, its liquidation 
and even its break-up may appear unreasonable An alternative could be to try to use 
it as an institution promoting savings and, in particular, rural financial market 
development with initial subsidies and guidance from international organizations 
(World Bank, EBRD). For instance, an empirical study by the World Bank analyzed 
a policy change in a government program of providing rural financial services in 
Indonesia in the mid 1990s. It was found that with an initial subsidy and a major 
policy change in this program from disbursing credit to innovative incentives for 
loan recovery, and to mobilizing savings, broadening the clientele, maintaining a 
sufficient interest-rate spread to cover the high costs of servicing small loans and 
deposits, the program increased lending and deposit taking and became profitable 
(Yaron et al., 1998). This could mean that an initial investment by international 
institutions into Sberbank and following such lines of reforming the bank could not 
only improve Sberbank’s function but also possibly counteract Russia’s substantial 
regional financial development problem, where often financial intermediation has 
simply not developed (see, for instance, OECD, 1997). 
 
  Table 4
Tests for unit roots of variables used in regressions
Period: 1995:1-2003:2 Period 1999:1-2003:2
ADF ADF  ADF  ADF 
Variable Description (Levels) (First differences) (Levels) (First differences)
log (GDPRPC) Log of real GDP per capita -1,60 (4) -4.41** (3) -5.88*** (2) -7.63*** (2)
log (I/GDP) Log of the ratio of total investment to GDP  -3.21 (5) -3.08** (5) -3.75** (2) -12.03*** (2)
FB/GDP Ratio of the consolidated fiscal balance to GDP -4.29** (3) -8.29*** (2) -3.26 (0) -5.66*** (0)
log (REXR) Log of the real exchange rate -2.48 (1) -3.57** (1) -1.61 (1) -10.91*** (1)
log (Oilp) Log of the export price for crude oil in US-Dollar -3.13 (1) -3.50* (0) -3.71** (1) -3.22** (1)
CPI growth rate CPI inflation -3.44* (1) -5.63*** (1) -4.15** (2) -3.55** (2)
log (XM/GDP) Log of the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP (openness) -2.75 (3) -5.52*** (2) -3.74** (3) -5.24*** (2)
log (GX/GDP) Log of the ratio of government expenditures to GDP -1.68 (2) -8.83*** (2) -2.61 (3) -4.01*** (3)
log (Ind/GDP) Log of the share of industry in GDP -1.34 (2) -6.59*** (1) -3.94** (1) -4.35** (1)
Financial indicator 1 Ratio of broad money to GDP -2.94 (8) -2.76* (8) -3.87** (1) -8.68*** (1)
Financial indicator 2 Ratio of domestic assets of commercial banks to the 
sum of domestic assets of banks and of the central bank -2.43 (3) -2.97** (1) -3.80** (5) -7.69*** (3)
Financial indicator 3 Share of credit to nonfinancial private sector in total credit -3.19 (1) -2.21 (0) -3.87** (4) -4.04*** (4)
Financial indicator 4 Ratio of credit to nonfinancial private sector to GDP -3.04 (8) -3.30** (8) -4.33** (5) -4.96*** (1)
Composite index of 
financial indicators 1-4 Index of indicators 1-4 , each equally weighted -3.03 (4) -3.66** (5) -3.74** (3) -4.05*** (1)
Note: T-statistics in parentheses. Using MacKinnon critical values. * indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level;
 ** indicates significance at the 5% percent level; *** indicates significance at the 1% percent level.
An intercept and time trend are included in the test equations for levels and an intercept is included in the test equations for first differences.  
The lag length is shown in parantheses behind estimated t-statistic. Choice of the lag length for the test is based on Akaike Info criterion.
Source: Author's calculations.Table 5
Real GDP and financial development regression results. Dependent variable: Log of real GDP per capita, log (GDPRPC).
Correction Ex-post  forecast:
Dummy for  for auto- RMS
structural Composite correlation (root  meanTheil's 
break in Financial Financial Financial Financial index of financial of the  S.E. of  squared  inequality
Equation Period Constant log (I/GDP) log (Oilp) log (REXR) t-2 1) FB/GDP 2) 1998:3  3) Indicator 1 t-1 Indicator 2 t-2 Indicator 3 t-2 Indicator 4 t-1 indicators 1- 4 t-2 adj. R
2 observ. residuals 4) regression D.W. error) coefficient
Using first differences of all variables except FB/GDP and the dummy variable:
(1) 1995:1 -0.0648 0.1789 0.100 -0.3197 1.237 -0.0850 0.439 29 no 0.0772 1.63 0.0699 0.3985
2003:1 (-1.819)* (4.041)*** (1.030) (-1.835)** (3.533)*** (-1.989)*
(2) 1995:1 0.1163 0.1180 0.299 -0.2590 1.319 -0.1495 0.5678 0.703 29 no 0.0554 2.03 0.0483 0.2572
2003:1 (2.802)** (2.620)** (3.793)*** (-2.152)** (3.322)*** (-3.391)*** (2.353)**
Using levels of all variables:
(3) 1999:1 -5.2409 0.1409 0.4014 0.773 17 yes 0.0706 1.51 0.0907 0.0147
2003:1 (-20.989)*** (2.316)** (2.844)**
(4) 1999:1 -4.6599 0.2128 0.2892 2.837 0.841 17 no 0.0591 1.66 0.0517 0.0083
2003:1 (-14.109)*** (3.183)*** (5.331)*** (4.470)***
(5) 1999:1 -4.7706 0.1529 0.2874 0.802 0.834 17 no 0.0604 1.65 0.0528 0.0085
2003:1 (-13.976)*** (2.262)** (5.176)*** (4.317)***
(6) 1999:1 -4.3962 0.1530 0.2271 0.506 0.874 17 no 0.0526 1.87 0.0459 0.0074
2003:1 (-15.047)*** (2.598)** (5.564)*** (5.355)***
(7) 1999:1 -4.4708 0.2134 0.2980 2.710 0.876 17 no 0.0521 2.01 0.0456 0.0073
2003:1 (-15.455)*** (3.622)*** (6.289)*** (5.420)***
(8) 1999:1 -4.7268 0.1243 0.2926 0.3336 0.914 17 no 0.0436 1.80 0.0380 0.0006
2003:1 (-19.400)*** (2.534)** (7.397)*** (6.929)***
Note: Simple OLS method is used on the assumption that the explanatory variables are exogenous. A Hausman test rejected the null hypothesis for endogeneity of the lagged financial indicator variables.   
T-statistics in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance of the respective variable at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5% percent level; *** indicates significance at the 1% percent level.
1) An increase denotes a real appreciaiton of the Russian ruble.
2) Ratio of the consolidated fiscal balance to GDP. An increase denotes an increase in the fiscal surplus.
3) The dummy variable takes the value of 1 starting third quarter 1998 and zero otherwise.
4) Cochrane-Orcutt method.
Source: Author's calculations.Figure 1














































(based on regression for 
period: 1995-2003)Figure 2
Russia: Actual and simulated evolution of financial indicators 1 and 2, 1993-2002












1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Actual indicators  Actual and simulated indicators 
Note: Simulation 1: Approximate continuation of improvements before the crisis in 1998. Simulation 2: Financial indicators increase linearly during 1998-
         2002 to the average level of each indicator reached in Hungary and Poland in 2002. Simulation 3: Indicators increase linearly during 1998:2-2002:4 to 
         highest average levels found for a sample of 71 countries during 1960-95.  











Russia: Actual and simulated evolution of financial indicators 3 and 4, 1993-2002









1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Actual indicators  Actual and simulated indicators 
Note: Simulation 1: Approximate continuation of improvements before the crisis in 1998, except indicator 3 as explained in the text. Simulation 2: Financial
         indicators increase linearly during 1998:2-2002:4 to the average level of each indicator reached in Hungary and Poland in 2002. Simulation 3:
         Indicators increase linearly during 1998:2-2002:4 to highest average levels during 1960-95 found for a sample of 71 countries.  























1998:3 1998:4 1999:1 1999:2 1999:3 1999:4 2000:1 2000:2 2000:3 2000:4 2001:1 2001:2 2001:3 2001:4 2002:1 2002:2 2002:3 2002:4 2003:1
Actual
Simulation 2: 
Instead of financial crisis linear improvement of 
financial indicators to respective average Hungarian 
and Polish levels at end of 2002 
1) The fitted line and the simulations shown here are those that result from using the regression for the period 1999-2003 (equation 8 in table 5).
    Assumptions underlying the simulations are shown in Figures 3 and 3a. 
2) During 1998:2 - 2002:4 financial indicators 1, 2 and 4 would have increased linearly to reach the highest average levels of these indicators




Instead of financial crisis very 
strong financial development 2)
Simulation 1: 
Instead of financial crisis linear modest improvement 
of financial indicators, which corresponds roughly to 
their trend improvement before the crisis Figure A1













































Real effective exchange rate
Source: Russian Economic Trends, Moscow.
Annualized real interest rate on loans